Chapter 3

Responding to disorder

This chapter looks at how forces respond once disorder occurs, with particular emphasis on large scale 'public' disorder, together with the systems and structures put in place.

3.1 Command Structure

3.1.1 All forces inspected had a sound understanding of the Gold, Silver, Bronze command structure.

Figure 3.1

Strategic Framework

Gold
Sets the overall strategy and is in overall command.

Silver
Co-ordinates the tactical response required to deliver/implement the strategy.

Bronze
Leads front line teams who implement tactics.

Her Majesty's Inspector noted solid support for this system, particularly from those forces that regularly police public order events. There were wide variations in forces visited so far as the level of available infrastructure to support the command system. Some forces had impressive 'silver command suites' from which the Silver Commander operates. They are fully equipped control rooms on divisions or command vehicles equipped with communications, briefing facilities and mapping and plotting aides. Other forces, with fewer large scale incidents to contend with, had less sophisticated command support facilities.

3.1.2 There were many examples of forces regularly undertaking exercises with other emergency services and agencies, to ensure that the Gold, Silver, Bronze command structure worked and was understood by all. Her Majesty's Inspector fully supports this and regards exercising with other emergency services and partners as good practice.

Specialist Commanders

3.1.3 In the forces inspected the selection of senior officers for command of public order incidents fell broadly into two camps. Some forces provide officers of a certain rank with command awareness training to enable local commanders,

with the assistance of tactical advisors, to command public order incidents. Others adopt a cadre system. This allows a small group of selected officers to receive more focused and specialist training for public order command. A number of factors will influence a force's decision to adopt a cadre system for commanders. In some forces it may not be possible to adopt a system due to the small numbers of commanders and the necessity of having a realistic resilience level to ensure the cadre is available. Forces that have adopted a cadre system point to the following benefits:

* **experience** – the opportunity to build experience amongst a relatively small number of individuals who are then able to make difficult and complex decisions from a position of knowledge.

* **value for money** – in larger forces the cost of command training for everyone of a specified rank, regardless of their role, would be prohibitive and unlikely to be required.

* **civil litigation** – with the increasing tendency for the new and emerging forms of protest to be accompanied by civil litigation and prolonged appeals, it is essential that the commanders, and the command structure, are of the highest quality to deliver the most professional service possible on the day.

3.2 Tactical Options

3.2.1 The ACPO Guide for Public Order Policing is the central reference point for police supervisors and trainers in the fundamental principles and objectives of public order policing. It contains a range of tactical options for dealing with disorder. The Inspection team heard concerns expressed by many that the tactical options do not take account of the newer forms of disorder that have been developed since the guide was updated in 1991. A new menu of tactical options is required to help operational commanders to police all forms of disorder they are now likely to encounter. Her Majesty's Inspector is aware of development work by the ACPO Public Order sub committee to update the guide. He believes it would be beneficial to forces if the guide complemented the conflict resolution guidance provided in the National Police Training, officer safety package. He encourages ACPO to move in this direction.

3.2.2 The ability for forces to share best practice and build upon it in relation to the policing of disorder was highlighted by a number of officers interviewed. The scenario was often recounted of a force facing massive protest in relation to a new road scheme, or other environmental protest; then having to trawl other forces to find one which had faced something similar and learn how it was dealt with. Her Majesty's Inspector is aware of ongoing work to develop the Operations Faculty of the Police Staff College Bramshill, designed to fulfil the role of collating and distributing best practice on a national basis. A number of officers interviewed during the Inspection suggested this would be extremely beneficial and saw the faculty developing to the point where it was regarded with the same high status as the National Crime Faculty[13] is for crime matters. Her Majesty's Inspector commends and supports this development.

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The National Crime Faculty located at Bramshill is regarded as a valuable asset in crime investigation and has built up a level of knowledge and expertise that is held in high regard internationally.

3.2.3 With just two exceptions, none of the forces inspected had the ability to respond to serious disorder with police baton round launchers or CS dispersed by police firearms marksmen. Some of these forces possessed baton round launchers and ammunition, but they had not trained officers in their use, and had not nominated or trained the 'Designated Senior Officers' whose role is to satisfy themselves that the criteria for deployment of these options have been met and the situation at the scene is such that it still justifies their use. The training demands placed on forces do result in a prioritisation of training with the result that where the risk assessment is very low, this type of training assumes a complementary priority. Her Majesty's Inspector urges forces to review their risk assessments in relation to this tactical option; if their risk assessment indicates they need these options available and they have the equipment they should train in its use. If their risk assessment indicates they do not require it, it is difficult to justify purchasing and maintaining equipment that no one is trained to use.

Good practice example

Firearms Command & Control within public disorder

The Metropolitan Police have trained officers to deal with firearm incidents occurring within a disorder situation. Protocols have been developed to minimise the potential for conflicting lines of command. Tactics have also been agreed to enable both the response to the disorder and the firearms incident contained within it, to operate simultaneously. Both the command protocols and the tactics have been operationally tested.

Legislation

3.2.4 It is inevitable that some of the police response to disorder is shaped by legislation. The new and emerging forms of protest pose interesting questions about the boundaries between civil and criminal law, and between the rights of individuals and those of society. The announcement of any new construction project that is remotely controversial heralds a period of 'defensive building', such as the construction of elaborate bunkers, trenches and tunnels, often containing highly dangerous booby traps posing considerable danger to those involved. Depending on the type of construction, the announcement of the project can proceed building by several years, giving protesters plenty of time to prepare 'defences' to prevent their speedy eviction from the site. A number of recent protest sites have seen even more elaborate and complex 'defences' being built. Guidance available on the internet describes how to spike trees to cause injury to anyone trying to cut the tree, and, for example, how to mix glass and debris into concrete making any cutting a potentially dangerous operation. The inevitable publicity around such protest has lead to a ratcheting up effect where new protest sites are being constructed with even more elaborate bunkers with concrete and scaffolding using sophisticated building techniques. The result is a structure that resembles a battlefield bunker. Existing legal remedies to prevent this fortification process are limited. Criminal powers such as those contained in

Section 61 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act require the landowner to take reasonable steps to ask trespassers to leave before the police can take action. However, there is little incentive for landowners to take such action, or secure their property, when it is awaiting development. The police service can only watch as the situation develops knowing that at some stage, they will be called upon to assist in removing the protesters. It is only a matter of time before someone; a protester, bailiff, security officer or police officer is seriously injured. Predictable tragedies of this nature should not be allowed to occur. Her Majesty's Inspector believes there is a real need for the development of new legislation, either criminal or civil law, to prevent this fortification process which goes far beyond the bounds of reasonable protest.

> **Recommendation**
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> Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the Home Office consider, in conjunction with those forces having recent experience, the need for new legislation designed to allow pre-emptive action to prevent the fortification process.

3.2.5 Whilst officers in the forces visited felt legislation in relation to Public Order was generally effective, the use of some of the powers under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act were found to be problematic and the level of evidence required to support successful charges was considerable. In enforcing this legislation officers have been faced with well briefed and motivated people who seek to test and probe the legislation. This has led to an increase in the use of video evidence gathering to provide the necessary evidence to support prosecutions. Some high profile police operations such as at the Newbury bypass have successfully used the legislation contained within Section 68 and 69 of the Act to deal with aggravated trespass. Others have chosen not to use this legislation but rely on powers contained in other legislation. The powers in the Act to direct trespassers to leave land, Section 61, were found to have been used widely in some areas but not in others. This can lead to frustrations with the local community and landowners that have a perception that a force will take a more active role in dealing with trespass. Her Majesty's Inspector is aware of the concerns and difficulties experienced with some parts of the legislation, particularly in relation to powers to remove trespassers under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, but feels strongly that a more consistent and robust approach both within forces and between forces would benefit local partners and the community. This issue is one Her Majesty's Inspector would expect to see reflected in local audits and strategies required under the Crime and Disorder Act. The work currently being undertaken by the ACPO Public Order Sub Committee to revise policy guidance is to be welcomed and should ensure a greater consistency of approach across all forces. A Home Office research study[14] looking at trespass and protest provides a good commentary and guide on the use of this piece of legislation.

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Home Office Research Study 190 Trespass and Protest: policing under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.

3.2.6 The Crime and Disorder Act has introduced a number of new measures designed to address disorder and anti-social behaviour, these are welcomed and will provide additional options and solutions for tackling disorder. Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBO's) will now provide a measure of protection, previously unavailable, from incidents of low level disorder.

3.2.7 There is a clear need for legislation and its application to be researched, with officers being well briefed on their powers. This has been recognised by several forces that have produced many good examples of law guides for specific operations, including for example a video on the legal issues associated with policing foxhunts.

3.3 Intelligence led policing

3.3.1 In responding to disorder it is essential that the intelligence led focus remains. The intelligence gathering and dissemination only changes in terms of speed of operation should disorder move from low level into the level of serious disorder or riot and its subsequent return to normality. A number of forces have developed information and intelligence structures to support their response to disorder and help them to quickly reduce it and bring it under control.

Good practice example

Live input to incidents

Devon & Cornwall Police within their intelligence structure have the capability to feed intelligence into live incidents via the Command and Control system. A person in headquarters intelligence monitors ongoing incidents and ensures any current intelligence is brought to the attention of the officer at the scene. This provides invaluable additional information to help resolve incidents.

Good practice example

Force level response

In response to short term disorder problems Greater Manchester Police have adopted the practice of forming a strategic group led by the ACCs for crime and operations. This acknowledges the inter-relationship between crime and disorder and enables resources to be mobilised in a focused and effective manner, to reduce or prevent disorder, or deliver a co-ordinated pro-active response to ongoing events.

Good practice example

Use of off road motorcycles

Intelligence and experience has led to the development of innovative tactics to respond to the policing of hunts. Staffordshire and Kent use traffic officers on off road motorcycles to monitor hunt saboteurs. This has proved most effective in that the officers are able to maintain contact with the saboteurs over all kinds of terrain. They can act as a forward intelligence unit assisting ground commanders in officer deployment.

Good practice example

Public order intelligence system

The Metropolitan Police have developed a public order Intelligence system, which it uses and finds of benefit to commanders, Senior Investigating Officers (SIOs) and operational officers. Its structure is valid for single events of disorder, both pre-planned and spontaneous, and supports broader based intelligence data systems on an ongoing basis. The basic structure:

–   **Gold**
    The most senior officer involved (often of ACPO rank). Sets the strategy for the event.

–   **Silver**
    Generally an officer junior to Gold who determines the tactics to implement the strategy set by Gold.

–   **Bronze**
    Generally junior to Silver and responsible for implementing the tactics, there may be more than one Bronze; responsibility would be divided either geographically or by function.

–   **The Intelligence Co-ordinator**
    Manages the intelligence for the event and directs and co-ordinates the intelligence gathering processes, and feeds to Silver.

–   **Intelligence Cell**
    Situated in the control room during an event. Assists the Intelligence Co-ordinator to manage intelligence and operate the radio channels used by Forward Intelligence Team.

–   **The Intelligence Team Manager**
    Manages the Forward Intelligence Team during an event.

–   **Forward Intelligence Team (FIT)**
    Two or more trained officers who are deployed to gather intelligence on the ground.

–   **Public Order Intelligence Unit**
    A full time, long term central point for the collation of public order intelligence.

3.4 Operational Support

3.4.1 Operational Support Units were viewed by forces visited to be effective resources for policing disorder. These units generally comprised of mounted branches, air support, and dog sections, as well as Tactical Aid Units/Territorial Support Groups.

3.4.2 All forces inspected acknowledged the worth of police horses in public order situations and other events where public safety is a priority. Their weight and mobility give them the flexibility to be used both defensively, to discourage hostile behaviour or hold back a crowd, or for more robust tactical options. Evidence was also produced that their high visibility and presence is beneficial in preventing low level disorder.

3.4.3 The issue of police mounted units is one that is currently the subject of debate in a number of forces. One force has recently disbanded its mounted unit following analysis that suggested improved value for money could be achieved from other policing options. Others have decided to retain them, having reviewed their role to ensure they are used effectively and efficiently. The utility of mounted units was acknowledged, even by those forces that did not possess them, but frequently made use of them from neighbouring forces. One possible long term solution for mounted units could be to share the costs involved on a bi-lateral or regional basis, in a similar way that Air Support Units are funded. This offers attractive economies of scale, and whilst the proposal is not without logistical problems, it does offer an alternative way of achieving support from what can be a valuable and effective resource. In some cases forces without mounted units have devised dog tactics which mirror those for horses. Her Majesty's Inspector is concerned that dogs are not used as a substitute for horses in all circumstances of disorder. The deployment of dogs to deal with disorder is a sensitive issue, which has the potential to portray the police service in a negative light. In this respect the guidance issued in the ACPO Guide to Public Order Policing for the use of dogs remains current.

3.4.4 The expansion of Air Support Units, with both fixed and mobile CCTV down link were seen as essential tools in facilitating effective command and control of public order incidents. The ability to watch events unfold as they happen is widely valued. Those forces inspected without their own Air Support Unit frequently made use of aircraft from neighbouring forces for pre planned public order operations.

Good practice example

Use of an airship to monitor disorder

South Wales Police used a commercial airship to monitor the venue of a government conference. This allowed an excellent overview of the event and was a cost effective alternative to the force's shared air support unit.

3.4.5 Territorial Support Groups/Tactical Aid Units exist, or are in the process of being formed, in several of the forces inspected. These groups/units typically consist of a number of officers who are selected and trained to a higher level than an average patrol officer. They are usually available to be deployed throughout the force area and are viewed as an effective first line response to disorder, or in support of crime and other divisional initiatives. It is essential that these units have clear leadership, agreed priorities and are well tasked, thus ensuring effectiveness and value for money. As with all support units special thought needs to be given to communicating what the unit is doing and how it fits with the Policing Plan and other force priorities. One issue that can arise is the situation where these units have a dual role; they provide a response to disorder and to firearms incidents. In this situation potential deployment conflicts may emerge as forces are reluctant to commit them to extended disorder incidents and in so doing, lose their firearms capability.

3.5 Multi-agency Partnership

3.5.1 As a result of numerous discussions with police officers and local authority chief executives, Her Majesty's Inspector learnt that local plans prepared as a result of partnership activity following the Crime and Disorder Act may cause a degree of tension with regard to policing priorities. A number of people interviewed were concerned that local plans might have different priorities to those at force level. The statutory duties placed upon partners in the Crime and Disorder Act were welcomed as a clarification and endorsement of the role of partnerships in tackling crime and disorder. This whole area is one where substantial work is ongoing to ensure the smooth implementation of the requirements of the Act.

Good practice example

> **Responding to disorder with other agencies**
>
> Kent County Constabulary was encountering a considerable rise in crime including the use of firearms in Dover. Illegal profits from 'boot legging' opportunities were attracting professional criminals into the town creating a significant increase in violence as gangs fought to control this lucrative activity. A climate of fear and unease arose in affected neighbourhoods.
>
> A joint operation was established with HM Customs and Excise, Seeboard, DSS (Fraud Benefits) and the Local Authority. Good liaison was established with the Port Authorities, Ferry Operators and a private finance company. The results, over a nine month period, included 85 police arrests, 56 customs arrests, stolen property recovered to the value of £156,000, goods seized by customs worth £1.3 million and DSS fraud savings estimated at £500,000. Significantly, there was a 28% reduction in crimes of violence over the same period.

3.5.2 In responding to disorder it is important that all partners have agreed the objectives to ensure the desired outcome is achieved. Partnership working is not a soft option for dealing with disorder. It offers forces the opportunity to bring

wider experience and resources to bear in resolving a problem. One of the areas highlighted by a number of forces is the partnership arrangements supporting CCTV operations. All the forces inspected greatly valued CCTV schemes and actively supported their ongoing development.

Good practice example

Use of CCTV in Kent

Kent County Constabulary, in common with a number of other forces, has developed a code of practice with their partners to ensure consistency of systems and procedures throughout Kent. The code covers the following areas;

– what the system will be used for;

– what the system will not be used for;

– the publication of a procedural manual detailing its use;

– data protection;

– ownership of the system;

– monitoring and evaluation of the system;

– systems management dealing with tape storage, access to tapes and release of tapes;

– staff training;

– lines of accountability;

– control room practice, including situations when the police may wish to use the system; and

– a complaints procedure.

Having a standard code such as this in place clarifies roles and responsibilities and ensures the use of the system is a shared objective.

3.6 Equipment

3.6.1 Officers confronting disorder situations require equipment that will enable them to carry out their task effectively, with maximum safety for them and the public. Recent years have seen the provision of new officer safety equipment such as batons, quick-cuffs, body armour and CS spray, that provide excellent protection for officers during incidents of low level disorder. In more serious outbreaks of disorder a range of more extensive and well tested equipment is available, including overalls, helmets and shields.

3.6.2 Officers interviewed in all forces inspected were very positive about the benefits of their officer safety equipment. Individuals reported feeling more confident when confronting anti-social behaviour and low level disorder. The only concern raised surrounded body armour. Some forces had supplied all their officers with covert armour which have proved uncomfortable and therefore unpopular. One force made the wearing of armour mandatory, but anecdotal evidence suggested that some officers did not comply. Forces, with the assistance of the Police

Scientific Development Branch (PSDB), are still seeking the optimum armour that combines both protection and comfort.

3.6.3 In July 1998 the Police (Health and Safety) Act came into operation requiring all forces to comply with UK Health and Safety legislation. The Personal Protective Equipment regulations (PPE) require that adequate protection is given to those undertaking operational duties. Both pieces of legislation are very relevant to policing disorder and will assist in shaping the requirements for equipment and training. The PSDB have for many years been providing high quality professional advice, setting specifications and testing equipment for use by the police. This helps to ensure all equipment complies with Health and Safety and PPE regulations.

3.6.4 Procurement practices for public order equipment varied in the forces visited as did the liaison and take up of advice from PSDB. Some forces have developed tactics that require particular variations in equipment such as batons and shields. As a result difficulties can arise when forces work together using incompatible equipment and tactics.

3.6.5 The current situation regarding the disparity and in-compatibility of public order equipment needs to be managed now. Her Majesty's Inspector was disappointed to find that the awareness of this situation at a senior management level was generally low. The effectiveness of PSUs operating on a mutual aid basis is hindered considerably by forces having different batons, shields and radios. Knowledge of such limitations is vital for operational commanders.

3.6.6 Opportunity exists to streamline procedures and a precedent has been set. CS spray has been procured on a national basis with all the financial benefits that accrue from such an exercise. Similar practices are developing with regional procurement of police equipment which can be extended to include public order equipment. Her Majesty's Inspector views these procurement agreements as best practice and their value to the service was outlined in **'What Price Policing'**[15]. The benefits of such procurement practices are both financial, and operational, and will provide greater consistency, allowing mutual aid from several forces to operate more effectively.

> **Recommendation**
>
> Her Majesty's Inspector recommends the ACPO establish a nationally agreed common minimum standard of equipment to be carried by PSUs on mutual aid.

15

HMIC What Price Policing first published April 1998

16

HMIC Officer Safety Minimising the Risk of Violence first published October 1997.

17

PR24 is commonly referred to as the side handled baton.

3.6.7 Some forces have allowed their officers a choice of batons as recommended in '**Minimising the Risk of Violence**'[16]; one force has allowed a choice of six. This has resulted with public order trained officers possessing a baton that is not compatible with tactics when using shields. In the main this refers to the PR24[17].

3.6.8 The effectiveness of these officers if deployed to deal with disorder is hampered and also raises risk assessment issues. One force has recognised this problem and retains a supply of batons suitable for public order available for issue. Her Majesty's Inspector commends this as good practice.

3.7 Mutual Aid

3.7.1 All forces inspected had a different interpretation of the level and nature of the tactics to be trained to achieve the Mutual Aid Standard. Commanders of public order incidents should anticipate significant differences in the capability of Police Support Units they receive in response to a request for mutual aid from other forces. This difference will be compounded by the incompatibility of some public order equipment, particularly with regard to the many different types of shield and baton currently in use, and radios that do not work in other force areas.

3.7.2 The swift provision of mutual aid requires all forces to have an effective and regularly tested mobilisation plan. Forces that were regularly called upon to provide mutual aid both within their force and beyond generally had comprehensive and tested mobilisation plans. Other forces perceived this to be less of a priority and some had either limited mobilisation plans or none at all. It was disappointing to observe that within many of the forces inspected there were some notable key personnel, particularly in control rooms, that displayed a very poor understanding of mutual aid call out procedures.

3.7.3 There is a requirement for national consistency for interpretation of mutual aid commitments. Some forces trained exactly the number of officers as laid down in their ACPO agreed mutual aid commitment. Others recognised that to provide that number of officers, significantly more officers would have to be trained to take account of abstractions caused by sickness, leave and court etc.

3.8 Investigation of Disorder

3.8.1 Large scale disorder will inevitably be followed by a criminal investigation led by a Senior Investigating Officer (SIO), supported by a team of investigators, to bring offenders to justice. Successful prosecutions help communities retain confidence in their police, deter future offences and are an important element in the police response to disorder.

3.8.2 However, with the exception of the Metropolitan Police Service, the police nationally provide little specific training for SIOs and their teams in the investigation of disorder. The recent ACPO work on the Murder Investigation Manual and the revised Aide Memoir for SIOs provides generic guidance which is applicable to disorder. However, the inspection team found that many detectives had little appreciation of the potential scale and implications of conducting such an investigation; the experiences of the few officers that had was not always being effectively disseminated.

> **Recommendation**
>
> Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the ACPO ensure training programmes for officers nominated to undertake the SIO role, include guidance and best practice on the investigation of disorder.

Similarly, public order trained officers, especially those in command roles, would benefit from a heightened awareness of the needs of an SIO. This will ensure closer co-operation and consideration of the ideal level of evidence gathering the SIO requires. It is only by achieving this mutual understanding of roles that the inevitable difficulties with post incident investigation will be minimised. This appreciation could be incorporated into routine public order training.

3.8.3 It was encouraging to note that when preparing for an event that could attract disorder several forces included an SIO at the strategic planning stage. This is good practice and enables the SIO to inform and add value to the strategy. The SIO can also undertake responsibility for introducing case paper preparation systems and liaise with the CPS and courts. All these activities are best undertaken in slow time before any event rather than in the immediacy after disorder has arisen.

3.8.4 Prisoner receipt and handling arrangements for pre-planned events were found to be well organised in the forces inspected. However arrangements to deal with spontaneous disorder were not well planned. The disparate nature of existing arrangements risks the potential loss of evidence with individual custody suites responding in different ways.

Good practice example

Prepared charge centre process

The Metropolitan Police Service have several custody suites capable of undertaking charge centre roles though predominately on a pre-planned basis. It has also identified one centrally located custody facility to receive large numbers of prisoners from spontaneous disorder. Contingency plans exist covering staffing, with specific job descriptions, accommodation, prisoner flow systems, case paper preparation and associated documentation. The process can be established within one hour.

3.8.5 The Inspection team found that scope exists for all forces, with either a large cell complex or a number of smaller complexes strategically located, to develop charge centre processes as part of an overall disorder contingency plan.

3.8.6 Successful prosecutions rely on good quality evidence that is professionally presented. The use of CCTV, video and to a degree 'stills' cameras provide evidence that offenders have difficulty rebutting. In contrast personal evidence provided by police officers involved in disorder is more open to challenge.

3.8.7 Some forces have developed trained Evidence Gathering Units (EGU). They operate at the scene of disorder gathering evidence that can be acted upon during disorder or subsequently in the investigation phase. They are a powerful tactical tool and it has been observed that the mere deployment of such units can reduce disorder. It is apparent that the range of uses for EGUs can go far beyond serious disorder as their evidence, prior to events or incidents, can prove invaluable in showing associations or planning by individuals and groups. Failure to consider deploying such a tactical option reduces the ability to gather best evidence.

3.9 Return to Normality

3.9.1 The strategic aim of any police response to disorder is to return the affected community or location to normality. What is defined as normal will vary from one area to another. The early involvement of other agencies at a strategic level is an essential element in co-ordinating this return. Some forces appoint the local police commander in this co-ordinating role and combine it with media liaison. This builds on established contacts and communicates a positive message to the community. It is also important that this activity links with the tactical options being deployed to reduce tension. Tactics found in the ACPO Public Order Manual provide flexible options to assist in defusing tension and aid the return to normality.

3.9.2 Her Majesty's Inspector found that in forces not regularly encountering disorder the awareness at senior level of the strategic issues and tactical options to manage the return to normality was poor. This is viewed as indicative of the lack of training undertaken in some forces and should be remedied.

Checklist

Command structure	Yes	No
Does the force have sufficient trained commanders to meet its expected needs?	☐	☐
Is the Gold Silver Bronze command system understood throughout the force?	☐	☐

Tactical options	Yes	No
Does the force publish a menu or checklist of tactical options and authority levels?	☐	☐
Are event planners and ground commanders aware of such options?	☐	☐
Are public order legislative briefing packs researched and produced?	☐	☐
Does the force hold a register of trained and experienced senior officers for disorder?	☐	☐

Operational support	Yes	No
Do commanders and planners know the support units capabilities and limitations?	☐	☐
Does the force have effective secondary tasking and prioritisation systems for its support units?	☐	☐
Where units have a dual role have deployment priorities been established?	☐	☐

Equipment	Yes	No
Are procurement and evaluation systems in place?	☐	☐
Are the benefits from PSDB exploited?	☐	☐
Are all officers trained to MAS properly equipped?	☐	☐
Is regular refresher training provided for batons, CS spray and Quick-Cuffs?	☐	☐

Checklist

Chapter 3
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	Yes	No
Are accurate training records kept?	☐	☐
Is there a standard list of public order equipment available in the force?	☐	☐

Mutual aid

	Yes	No
Are the key personnel at management level and in control rooms aware of their responsibilities in mobilising aid?	☐	☐
Is the force mobilisation plan tested, reviewed and updated regularly?	☐	☐
Are mobilisation time-scales realistic and effective?	☐	☐
Is there awareness within the force of the level of compatibility with surrounding forces about communications, equipment and tactics?	☐	☐
Is there resilience within force to provide the nationally agreed mutual aid levels regardless of routine abstractions?	☐	☐

Investigation of disorder

	Yes	No
Has training been provided to officers identified to undertake the role of SIO?	☐	☐
Are SIOs involved in the planning process of events with potential for disorder?	☐	☐
Does the force have charge centre contingencies for handling large numbers of prisoners both pre-planned and spontaneous?	☐	☐
Are evidence gathering units trained and available?	☐	☐
Does the force have a Criminal Justice Policy that accommodates the processing of large numbers of prisoners?	☐	☐

Return to normality

	Yes	No
Are details of community representatives available?	☐	☐
Are partnership agencies aware of their role in assisting the 'return to normality'?	☐	☐
Are commanders aware of the tactical options available for managing the 'return to normality'?	☐	☐